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The Dangers of Government Gridlock
and the
Need for a Constitutional Convention

By Barry Keene
California Senate Majority Leader

There is near-universal belief that government is failing society.
Society is changing dynamically. Government responds slowly when it responds at
all.
Society is diversifying ethnically, culturally and economically. Government is
unable to reconcile predictable conflicts.
Our quality of life is declining precipitously. Government is too deadlocked to
reverse the trend.
In facing society's problems, legislative bodies -- Congress and the state
legislatures -- should be uniquely useful. Instead, they are particularly paralyzed.
The U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions provide for constitutional
conventions to update the basic structures of government. In California, at least, the
failure of existing structures requires one now.
Some people argue that the problems of government are personal rather than
structural. They say our leaders do not lead, do not care, or are crooks. But those
charges beg the question -- why do even the best people in government accomplish so
little? The reasons are partly societal, as mentioned, partly attitudinal, as I will note, but
mainly structural.
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The voters of California got angry in 1990 and enacted term limits; we can expect
the voters of other states to do the same. But the voters can be expected to get even
angrier when they see a lot of new faces in government who cannot solve the problems
of society either.
Most causes of paralysis -- divided government, incumbent-oriented redistricting,
expensive campaigns and special-interest contributions, weak parties, and a pattern of
failure -- are common to the federal and many state governments, though they appear to
have hit California hardest.
One other cause -- a long, complex, and very restrictive constitution -- is special to
this state.
No one can prescribe a California constitutional convention's full agenda, much
less the structural revisions it might recommend to the voters. However, I believe it
should address all the major causes of government gridlock.
Major Causes of Government Paralysis
1. Divided government. The U.S. and California constitutions invite voters to
elect legislative majorities of one philosophy and chief executives of another philosophy.
The voters accept the invitation regularly.

Enacting policy that moves in one direction, while implementing it in the opposite
direction, virtually guarantees stalemate.
The problem is worsened by whatever political divisions exist between the two
houses of the legislative branch of government.
Dispersion of power may make some sense for the federal government, which has
great power. But the states copied it mindlessly, shackling themselves in their attempts
to solve their problems and leaving them less able to stand up to the growth of federal
power in this century.
In California, our government is not only divided but subdivided. We are virtually
alone in requiring a two-thirds majority of each house of the Legislature to decide most
controversial matters, including the budget. The consequences are devastating. A tiny
minority can bring this state of 31 million people to a halt.
The Governor and each party in each house then blame each other for inaction.
The public thinks nobody is in control. The public is right.
The buck does not stop anywhere.
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Ironically, the minority party suffers as much as the majority from the two-thirds
requirement. Faced with some unavoidable decisions, the minority party must constantly
fracture itself to provide the last few votes needed to achieve two-thirds majorities. The
resulting bitterness destabilizes leadership and thereby robs the public of the benefits of a
unified opposition party that can develop and present a coherent and useful alternative
policy agenda.
No wonder many people think there is no difference between the parties.
Part of the solution, I believe, is a one-house Legislature like Nebraska. Local
governments do not disperse authority between two city councils or two boards of
supervisors, corporations do not disperse it between two boards of directors, and the
state should not disperse it between a Senate and an Assembly.
But a one-house Legislature, even without the two-thirds vote requirement, still
would leave government divided between the legislative and executive branches at a time
when we can ill afford it.
In a parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, the voters elect a fully
accountable group of representatives both to develop and carry out policy. Each party is
free to develop a clear, principled policy agenda and put it forward for public debate.
The voters know exactly whom to re-elect when they are pleased with the results, and
whom to defeat when they are displeased. Each new majority has both the power and
the mandate to make the changes the voters want -- and no excuse not to.
California should look at Britain, Canada, Japan, Germany and many other
democracies and consider a parliamentary system.
The world offers a wide variety of parliamentary democratic forms we should
study. In 200 years, no real democracy has copied the United States' divided-government
form -- which has been very popular, however, among oligarchies and dictatorships using
powerless parliaments to masquerade as democracies.
2. Incumbent-oriented-redistricting. Several rounds of sophisticated,
computerized redistricting in the 1960s, '70s and '80s maximized the percentage of "safe"
seats in Congress and the Legislature.
For all practical purposes, the seats' occupants became unaccountable for their
failure to produce solutions, because they were re-elected almost automatically. They
were free to hold policy decisions hostage to their ideological or personal wishes
indefinitely. Extremists on each side became ever more extreme, and more stubborn,
leaving the center too lean to act.
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Incumbent-oriented redistricting is a
It
who
appearance of power is only
appear strong; no one can beat them at the polls. But
that. The body of which they are part is afflicted with the insidious, fatal disease of
it
perpetual deadlock. Its
can accomplish
created an equaHy unbeatable and determined
Minority-party legislators,
by
hope of ever
achieving a majority, succumb to the temptation to attack the institution. When they
limit
ability to solve society's
succeed in weakening it, they
problems.
An independent commission, aided by
redraw district lines after each census
interest, assure legally required "'""'"''"'"
partisan bias, and maximize
No redistricting commission that's politically astute
to
job could be
perfectly neutraL But we do not need perfection.
we need is a substantially fairer
outcome than the Legislature itself can produce.
3.
Technology and professionalization have
made campaigns prohibitively expensive, particularly for challengers. Races for
competitive legislative seats can cost more than $1 million each.
The only sure source of the massive contributions needed to compete in elections
is wealthy special interests -- who cheerfully make contributions, mainly to protect the
status quo that made them prosperous.
Fresh ideas to

with change do not just die; they're murdered.

And it is all perfectly legal.
However, even the most powerful beneficiaries of the status quo are beginning to
recognize the risk of social explosion caused by escalating problems that gridlocked
government cannot solve.
The answers have been discussed for years -- spending
and the partial public funding
the courts have determined is
imposition of spending

contribution limits,
to allow

Damming the river of money that flows through the Capitol
could eliminate
the subtle temptations that can lure otherwise clean, well-intentioned men and women
into ethical compromises that damage both them and the
And it should make it
easier to catch the few outright predators.
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4. Weak parties. In California, and increasingly throughout the United States, we
have systematically reduced state political parties to
clubs.
it is parties, when
they are strong
to
demand
candidates
stand for something
Without

zero.

is to

. . leaders -- not
who
happens to be registered under a party label -- should have a principal say in selecting
to encourage parties to make
the party's candidates. One step in that direction would
pre-primary endorsements.
-of
~,
more
throughout
world -- would be to abolish the primary system, and allow each party's
by democratic minimum guarantees, to select its
candidates.
A

~uuu•u.

become key receivers and dispensers of campaign funds in

general
Empowering
to select and sustain candidates would revitalize them and
give substance to those
our trust. It would reduce markedly the attractiveness of
sound bites, spoon-fed to an apathetic public. Even more importantly, it would eliminate
the plague
campaigning, at least in primary elections. In general elections,
each party's candidates
to ideas and principles that could energize
significant, real

the product of a runaway initiative
Legislature
setting needed

our
rigidly
constitution,
effectively prevents the Governor and

expression

society

to
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If Madison was right about the need for well-functioning legislative bodies, and if
society is losing them, then we would expect to see signs of the twin threats of which
Madison warned -- chaos and tyranny.

Disturbingly, we do see those signs today.
Long before the Rodney King verdict, we saw signs of chaos. Our law
enforcement, prison, health, housing, education, and social service systems are
overwhelmed, with no real prospect for our neighborhoods or our natural environment
deterioration.
We see signs of potential tyranny in many voters' willingness literally to hand over
our precious government process to those about whom they know nothing except that
they are not incumbents. This is potential tyranny born of chaos -- a legal riot and a
looting of democratic values by part of the electorate itself.
I have not entirely given up on the incremental approach to revitalizing
government to avoid these consequences. My major effort in 1992 was a constitutional
amendment to mandate campaign finance reform in California. It passed the Senate but
failed in the Assembly.
The Need for a Constitutional Convention
The structural roadblocks to legislative decisionmaking also prevent the
Legislature from enacting most constitutional reform. This is why we need a
constitutional convention in California, and perhaps other states.
The risk of a runaway state convention is minor, compared with the near-certainty
of continued paralysis without one.
Only the voters may call a California constitutional convention. Its members
would not be politically appointed, but selected by the people. The convention's
proceedings would be open to full public view. It would have no power to touch the U.S.
Constitution -- including the federal courts, the Bill of Rights, and the guarantee of a
republican form of government in every state. Anything the convention produces would
be submitted to the voters for ratification or rejection. And at the very worst, if the
convention somehow wrote and the voters ratified a constitution that is even worse than
the one we have now, the voters would be free to change it again when their error
becomes clear.
There is no risk-free solution. We cannot both demand fundamental change, and
guard against it. It is a logical inconsistency, and that is why the founders provided for
future constitutional conventions.
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Ultimately, we must trust the wisdom of an informed electorate. That educational
process will occur if the question of true governmental reform is brought to center stage.
People do care -- when caring counts.
And what about a second Constitutional Convention for the United States?
The federal government is failing society just as surely as the state government is.
But one strength of the federal system is that the states can act as laboratories of
democracy. Constitutional conventions in several states could
governmental
forms to serve as federal models. At least as importantly, they could develop invaluable
experience -- and measure the reality of fears of a runaway federal convention.
California is the largest state. California has the largest problems. California
often leads the nation, for good or ill. California should be the first to call a
constitutional convention -- before we spin further out of control.

Senator Barry Keene (D-Ukiah) is the California Senate Majority Leader. He has taught
public policy at Stanford University.
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